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Abstract 
An arson attack brought great social reflection in Xiamen, June 2013. In this arson, 47 people died and 34 injured on a bus. Arson is a 
unique category of intentional attack that results in grave consequence once occurs. This paper establishes an arson assessment model 
based on the particular characteristic of arson, using the risk analysis methods. 8803 arson attacks from 2000 to 2011 in Global Terrorism 
Database are studied. Threat, vulnerability, consequence and risk aiming at different target types are compared, so as to provide technical 
support against arson for defensive arrangement and macro emergency decision. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Academic Committee 
of ICPFFPE 2013. 
Keywords: arson, intentional attack, public safety, global terrorism database, risk analysis. 
Nomenclature 
Rj arson risk of type j target (million dollar) 
Tj arson threat of type j target 
Vj vulnerability of type j target to arson events 
Cj average arson consequence of type j target (million dollar) 
N            attack number of a category in database 
Aj           number of attacker’s arson attempts to type j target 
Sj                   number of attacker’s successful arson attacks to type j target
Greek symbols 
ω subjective weight of value loss 
Subscripts 
j  target type code  
1. Introduction 
Arson is the crime of intentionally and maliciously setting fire to buildings, wildland areas, vehicles or other property 
with the intent to cause damage. It may be distinguished from other causes such as spontaneous combustion and natural 
wildfires. The definition shows that arson is an attack carried out by person with intention, so it is a kind of intentional 
attack. Three typical cases are as follow [1]. 
Case1: Daegu, Korea, Feb.18 2003. A 56 years old man surnamed Kim, who was suffering severe depression, used a 
lighter ignite a plastic pot filled with combustibles, on the train passing through the subway station at Central Road. This 
train and another one approaching from the opposite direction were powered off and 12 compartments were surrounded 
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with fire and smoke. The arson caused 198 people die and 146 injure. Kim confessed after arrested that he attacked in 
purpose of cynical mentality. “Compared to dying alone, it’s better to let others die with me.” As experts and media said, 
potentially dangerous facilities, imperfect legal system, formalistic safety education and weak safety consciousness of 
subway operating company were also the factors causing this event. Such sorrowful events also included the subway arson 
of Hong Kong happened in Feb 1st, in 2004 [2]. 
Case2: Xiamen, China, Jun.7 2013. A 61 years old man surnamed Chen set a fire on a bus numbered D-Y7396 on BRT 
line 1B from Jinshan station to Caitang station. The arson led 47 people die and 30 ones injure, including 8 college entrance 
exam candidates. Attacker Chen was burned to death in the arson too. The posthumous papers of Chen explained that he 
was pessimistic and world weary. Chen felt life unsatisfactory and made the arson out of spite. Bus facilities problem, BRT 
security measures and weak safety awareness of passengers are also factors in this arson [3].  
Case3: Xinjiang, China, Apr.23 2013. In Selibuya, Bachu, Kashgar of Xinjiang, three community staff interviewed 
residents. They found several suspicious people and controlled knives at one’s home. Then, the staff reported to their 
superiors, but were hijacked by thugs hidden in the house. Policemen and community cadres came to the scene separately, 
and were attacked and killed by thugs inside and outside the house. After that, thugs burned the house, all police and 
community cadres were killed. This violent and terrorist event caused 15 deaths including 10 Uighurs, 3 Hans and 2 
Mongols, 2 Uighurs injured [4].  
According to the cases above, arson have characteristic of human-induced hazards, sudden occurrence, serious damage to 
society, and the needs of emergency response measures. At the same time, the death in arson are deeply painful and 
despairing before they are dying. It’s difficult to cure injured people suffered arson because of severe harm to both body and 
spirit. The easiness to obtain flammable liquid and lighter makes defensive against arson more difficult. Therefore, scientific 
and effective measures specific to different targets are in urgent need, as well as manpower and material resources against 
arson. 
1.1. The variety and trend of intentional attack number 
Recent decades, intentional attack highly occurred. Gary Lafree [5] et al computerize global intentional attack data from 
1970s originally collected by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service and accumulate Global Terrorism Database. Attack 
properties, such as date, location, attacker, target type, attack type, weapon type, casualty and economic loss, are coded for 
intentional research. By the end of Sep.2013, total number of attacks reached 104,000. Fig.1 shows intentional attack 
information from 1970 to 2011. The figure describes that intentional attack number was in uptrend since 1970s and 
deceased to a controllable level since 1990s. After 2004, intentional attacks happened more frequently. The uptrend now 
mitigated a bit though the defense of intentional attack still faces big challenge. Data collection technology is improving 
since 21st century, and it is more important to analyze dynamic features of attacks in the new times. Therefore, 34886 
attacks data from 2000 to 2011 are analyzed in this article. 
(a)  (b)  
Fig. 1. Global intentional attack number in Global Terrorism Database (a) 1970-2011 and (b) 2000-2011 
1.2. The variety and trend of arson number 
“Arson” is an expression focused on attack type instead of consequence. On one hand, conflagration causes by non-
human factors don’t belong to the research of arson, such as forest fire. On the other hand, arson focuses on attacker’s 
attempting to cause casualty and economic loss through combustion. The reason that explosion don’t belong to arson is that 
the damage is from detonation wave rather than the highly occurred fires followed. There is no definition about which case 
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is arson in Global Terrorism Database. In this article, the data of weapon type named incendiary are used for research, 
including Arson/Fire, Flame Thrower and Gasoline or Alcohol [6]. Weapon type in Global Terrorism Database has 11 
categories, including Incendiary, Biological, Chemical, Explosives, Fake weapons, Firearms, Melee, Sabotage Equipment, 
Vehicle, Unknown and Other. Fig.2 describes the change of arson from 1970 to 2011. The number of arson is significantly 
increasing recent years. The occurrence probability keeps at about 10% since 1980s. Table.1 and table.2 contain the top five 
weapon types which have largest number from 2000 to 2011 and one year count in 2011, and “Other” includes other types 
except first five ones. Arson threat ranks the third, next to explosion and firearms. Statistical results of different weapon 
types in Global Terrorism Database are shown in Fig.3. 
(a)  (b)  
Fig. 2. Variety of arson number (a) and percentage (b) in Global Terrorism Database from 1970 to 2011 
Table 1. Weapon types with more occurrence probability from 2000 to 2011 
Weapon type Incident number Percentage 
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite 19156 54.91% 
Firearms 10892 31.22% 
Unknown 2066 5.92% 
Incendiary 1799 5.16% 
Melee 743 2.13% 
Other 231 0.66% 
Total 34887  
Table 2. Weapon types with more occurrence probability in 2011 
Weapon type Incident number Percentage 
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite 2743 53.54% 
Firearms 1626 31.74% 
Unknown 336 6.56% 
Incendiary 268 5.23% 
Melee 123 2.40% 
Other 27 0.53% 
Total 5123  
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(a)  (b)  
Fig. 3. Statistical results of different weapon types in Global Terrorism Database (a) 2000-2011 and (b) 2011 
1.3. Researches at home and abroad 
Internal arson studies concentrate on attack’s arson motivation, arson simulation, attacker detection and firefighting 
management. Jin Xiufen(1992) [7] summarized and divided attack’s arson motivation into 6 types such as vengeance, 
occultation, economics, politics, spirit and sensation seeking. Mei Xiujuan(2011) [8] considered fire scene features on 
subway under intentional attack, including distribution rule of heat release rate, smoke concentration, temperature, smoke 
density. Yang Chunying et al (2011) [9] made numerical simulation of flow field characteristics after 0.6MW arson heat 
suddenly released in a bus, providing distribution rule of instant velocity and temperature field. Zhi Youran et al(2009) [10] 
brought Bayes Network into fire investigation field. They analyzed the interaction among reason event, result event and 
each of the factors in case of arson with combustion improver. Yang Zhijie et al(2002) [11] analyzed problems and 
management countermeasures of domestic subway fire safety.  
The arson study in Fire engineering, psychology, psychiatry and criminology is more completed abroad. Shen T S et 
al(2008) [12] used computation fluid dynamic software to provide evidences for fire investigation and to explain fire 
development and demonstrate smoke movement through describing the configuration of fuel, effects of ventilation and  
design of the building. Bradford J M et al [13] (1982) proved that arson is most frequently committed by males who 
suffered from personality disorder, mental retardation or depressive neurosis. Jackson H F et al [14]  (1987) built the model 
which incorporates adaptations of the displaced aggression and arousal hypotheses of arson. They also examined possible 
developmental aspects of pathological arson from normal childhood fire play, as well as suggested that a transition from fire 
setting in the company of others to incendiarism alone constitutes a major factor in the pathological process. Fritzon K et al 
(2001) [15] considered two forms of destructive behavior, arson and barricade-hostage terrorist incidents, to provide support 
for the appropriateness of the action system framework as a way of viewing productively criminal and deviant behavior. 
Kocsis R N et al(2004) [16] examined the accuracy of professional profilers with others, in constructing a profile of a serial 
arsonist in response to case information presented, and the result is the professional profilers produced the profiles more 
accurate than senior detectives and fire investigators methods. Prestemon J P et al(2005) [ 17 ] used six Poisson 
autoregressive models of order p[PAR(p)] to estimate daily wild land arson ignition counts for five locations in Florida 
(1994-2001), the result reveal highly significant arson ignition autocorrelation. 
According to the researches above, the uncertainty of complicated factors involved, such as analysis on psychology and 
characteristic of arsonists, fire scene simulation and criminal detection means, makes it difficult to study on arson. While the 
distribution of arson defense in different target types is lacking, which concludes arson prevention and reduction of 
consequential loss. Arson prevention is divided into two aspects, control of arsonist and arson process. Researches on 
arsonist characteristic help to recognize potential arsonists, on the other hand, control of arson utensil could decrease arson 
occurrence rate. However arson utensils are easily required in usual, such as gasoline, alcohol and lighters, unlike other 
weapons with circulating limits, making it more difficult to prevent. Refer to consequential loss, it’s significant to make 
appropriate distribution of fire extinguishing facilities. The measure and intensity of defense are focused primarily in arson 
management in reality. It’s common to see defensive measures like liquid inspection and firefighting facilities against 
subway arson, while arson defense of private property and government is vulnerable. Arson defensive intensity against 
different target types is the main research point of this article. 
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2. Research 
2.1. Research method 
The acceptance of risk is estimated using following formula[18], risk is a function of threat T, vulnerability V and 
consequence C: 
R T V C u u
                                                                                      
(1) 
 Now the arson risk of different target type is analyzed. The arson threat T of the type j target can be expressed as the 
probability that arson incidents happened in that target type. Refer to Eq. (2), 2199 arson incident data between 2000 and 
2011 are used in this study, instead of using the Delphi Method, which makes the study more statistically significant. 
( )
T ( )
N Ajj N Aj
j
 ¦
                                                                                       
(2) 
     The vulnerability of the type j target under arson attack can be expressed as the success rate of the arson attacks 
happened in that target type. The negative correlation between the target vulnerability and its defence capability is obvious. 
It could be understood that the vulnerability calculated by Global Terrorism Database would be overestimated, for the 
mainly source of the database is media report. Incidents with higher news value, such as successful arson attacks, are 
media’s preference, so the unsuccessful data which are not included in Global Terrorism Database are more than the success 
ones. Even though, the vulnerability competition among different target types is significant in the condition of large 
numbers. The vulnerability of arson attack can be calculated by Eq. (3). 
( )
( )
N S jV j N Aj
 
                                                                                       
(3) 
When the arson attack on the type j target success, it would lead to consequence C, which can also be called target value 
loss. Million dollar is used as the unit of consequence. The target value loss includes four main aspects: economic value loss, 
human value loss, symbolic value loss and other value loss [19]. As for arson, economic value loss means the economic loss 
in an arson attack, including direct consequence caused by the target function loss, and indirect consequence such as post-
processing loss. Human value loss means the labor force reduce of the casualties and their relatives in an arson attack, as 
well as the baneful human rights influence and so on. Symbolic value loss means the loss caused by the symbolic meaning 
attached to the target. For example, the Reichstag Burn happened in Berlin Germany in 1933 has a higher symbolic value 
loss because its profound historical influence. Other value loss includes society turmoil, people’s panic and so on. The 
consequence of arson attack can be calculated by Eq. (4). 
(S )C e h s oj e h s oZ Z Z Z   
                                                                     
(4) 
where  ω  means the subjective weight of different value losses, related to the values of the stakeholders. Then the arson 
risk of different target types can be calculated by the equations above.  
2.2. Procedure 
Global Terrorism Database codes the target type into 22 categories, they are Abortion Related, Airports & Airlines, 
Business, Educational Institution, Food or Water Supply, Government (Diplomatic), Government (General), Journalists & 
Media, Maritime, Military, Non-governmental Organization, Police, Private Citizens & Property, Religious 
Figures/Institutions, Telecommunication, Terrorists, Tourists, Transportation, Utilities, Violent Political Party, Unknown 
and Others. In order to consider the newest development tendency of arson threat, the 396 attacks happened in 2009 are 
calculated, for the number of arson in year 2009 is the largest in the 21st century. Some types of target are rarely fired 
according to the database, these target types are combined into type “others”. The arson threat of the different types of target 
between 2000 and 2011, as well as in 2009, are shown in Tab.3 and Tab.4. 
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(a)  (b)  
Fig. 4. The arson occurrence rate on different types of target (a) between 2000 and 2011 and (b) in 2009 
Table 3. The arson threat of the different types of target between 2000 and 2011 
Target type Incident number Threat Target type Incident number Threat 
Private Citizens & Property 508 23.10% Journalists & Media 28 1.27% 
Business 494 22.46% Other 23 1.05% 
Government (General) 289 13.14% Non-governmental Organization 20 0.91% 
Educational Institution 184 8.37% Terrorists 17 0.77% 
Transportation 181 8.23% Abortion Related 13 0.59% 
Police 126 5.73% Food or Water Supply 8 0.36% 
Telecommunication 94 4.27% Violent Political Party 6 0.27% 
Religious Figures/Institutions 74 3.37% Unknown 5 0.23% 
Government (Diplomatic) 47 2.14% Airports & Airlines 4 0.18% 
Military 36 1.64% Maritime 3 0.14% 
Utilities 36 1.64% Tourists 3 0.14% 
 
 
 Total 2199  
  
Table 4. The arson threat of the different types of target in 2009 
Target type Incident number Threat Target type Incident number Threat 
Private Citizens & Property 105 26.52% Non-governmental Organization 7 1.77% 
Business 83 20.96% Utilities 7 1.77% 
Government (General) 61 15.40% Maritime 2 0.51% 
Transportation 40 10.10% Military 2 0.51% 
Educational Institution 28 7.07% Terrorists 2 0.51% 
Police 27 6.82% Food or Water Supply 1 0.25% 
Telecommunication 13 3.28% Journalists & Media 1 0.25% 
Religious Figures/Institutions 9 2.27% Other 1 0.25% 
Government (Diplomatic) 7 1.77%    
 
 
 Total 396  
 
Considering that there might be great error just using insufficient data, risk is calculated from the top 8 types in threat. 
Number of this kind of data is 1950, 88.68% of total events from 2000 to 2011. 
The vulnerability is calculated through the information of whether a single attack is successful or not, as the results 
shown in Table.5 and Fig.5. 
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Table 5. The arson vulnerability of the different types of target between 2000 and 2011 
Target type Attack attempt number Successful attack number Vulnerability 
Private Citizens & Property 508 501 98.62% 
Business 494 479 96.96% 
Government (General) 289 280 96.89% 
Educational Institution 184 181 98.37% 
Transportation 181 176 97.24% 
Police 126 123 97.62% 
Telecommunication 94 92 97.87% 
Religious Figures/Institutions 74 71 95.95% 
Total 1950 1903  
 
Fig. 5. The arson vulnerability of the different types of target  
Global Terrorism Database mainly codes the economic value loss and human value loss. Viscusi used Value of Statistical 
Life to calculate the equilibrium of human value and economic value, and announced that the statistical economic value of 
an American worker is 7 million dollar [20]. Considering the average level of the life value in the world, it is assumed that 
subjective value loss weight of the dead is 1 million dollar in the following analysis, while the injured 0.01 million dollar. 
Subjective weight of economic value loss is 1 in the process of calculation. If there isn’t any information about economic 
value loss of the attack, the average loss of data in the same range would be used. Consequence of different target types is 
shown in Table.6 and Fig.6. 
Table 6. The arson attack consequence of the different types of target between 2000 and 2011 
Target type Consequence (million dollar) Target type Consequence (million dollar) 
Religious Figures/Institutions 42.89 Transportation 2.66 
Private Citizens & Property 29.11 Educational 
Institution 
2.59 
Government (General) 13.55 Business 1.74 
Police 2.68 Telecommunication 1.53 
 
 Average 12.09 
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Fig. 6. The arson attack consequence of the different types of target 
The arson risk of the different types of target is calculated through Eq. (1), the result is as followed:  
Table 7. The arson risk of the different types of target between 2000 and 2011 
Target type Risk (million dollar) Target type Risk (million dollar) 
Religious Figures/Institutions 42.89 Transportation 2.66 
Private Citizens & Property 29.11 Educational Institution 2.59 
Government (General) 13.55 Business 1.74 
Police 2.68 Telecommunication 1.53 
 
 Average 12.09 
 
Fig. 7. The arson risk of the different types of target 
2.3. Result 
Considering the calculations above. Target types Private Citizens & Property, Business, Government (General), 
Educational Institution, Transportation and Police have the highest threat. Half arson happen in Private Citizens & Property 
and Business targets, and threat of Transportation is increasing recent years. 
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Target type of Private Citizens & Property has the highest vulnerability and Educational Institution comes the second. 
The vulnerability of Religious Figures/Institutions is the lowest. 
In aspect of Consequence, target types of Religious Figures/Institutions, Private Citizens & Property and Government 
(General) are much more significant than others, and difference between other types is very small. 
Final calculation of risk indicates that, Private Citizens & Property, Government (General) and Religious 
Figures/Institutions are the most risky 3 target types, and arson on Private Citizens & Property is much more risky than 
other types. 
3. Discussion and Conclusion 
3.1. Result Discussion 
Study results indicate that target type of private citizens and property has the highest risk. Numbers of arson on private 
citizens and property occur in daily news reports, just like an attacker burns other’s house or vehicles for vengeance. There 
aren’t any firefighting facilities in most families and private cars, showing the weak safety awareness of property and people 
themselves. The more successful an arson could be, the higher risk it would cause. In order to reduce the risk, all citizens, 
especially children, should learn more knowledge about fire safety. For example, install fire-extinguisher and flame 
retardant blanket in each family and private car, keep doors and window closed when no one at home and so on. 
Meanwhile, arson on government (general) are highly risky. Citizens might be so extreme to attack government when 
unsatisfied about government policies. For instance, a man from Zhejiang province set a fire at town government in Nov.1st 
2012 because of housing dispute. Visitors are rarely checked up about combustible materials in normal governments, which 
increases the risk of government as an arson target. 
Arson less happened aiming at Religious Figures/Institutions in China, while arson referring to religions in other nations 
are usually massive. Hence the risk on religions is high, though the occurrence probability is low. However in China, it can’t 
be overlooked that many arson happen on educational institution and transportation. One example is that a 19 years old male 
villager who rushed into classroom in school hour and locked the door, ignited the gasoline taken with him at a kindergarten 
in Gongyi, Henan on May 8, 2006. The arson caused 3 infants dead and 14 injured. Events like this are heart-breaking, and 
it is realized that no matter university, middle school, primary school or kindergarten, the management of people access is 
incomplete and there are even few safety inspections of paraphernalia in education institutions. All these weakness provide 
opportunities for arsonists.  
Arson defense on transportations is not enough either. There are strict examinations on aircraft, train and subway, 
whereas the defense on short distance buses is inadequate. Large passenger capacity, crowded environment and incomplete 
firefighting and rescue facilities on short distance bus could increase arson risk. If there is a slight leakage of oil pipeline, 
the moving bus will become incendiary. Just a spark could cause an explosion, and the combustion is severe and speedy, 
burning out a bus within just 10 minutes. In the bus arson case in Xiamen motioned above, several passengers on the bus 
had smelt gasoline but didn’t realize the potential risk. In order to defend arson on this target, integrated supervision system 
of extinguishing measures, escaping management and equipment maintenance should be set up, such as examination of auto 
parts, emergency hammer, fire-extinguisher, flame retardant blanket and other facilities. Public awareness of fire safety 
should be improved as well. In the future, small-scale combustible detecting instrument could be placed nearby doors on bus 
to decrease arson risk. 
3.2. Future Work 
Pointing out the main limitation of study could help identifying future research direction. Arson factors are numerous and 
complex, and the study in this article could be improved further.  
On one hand, there are not enough data of China from Global Terrorism Database for statistics, so the research 
conclusion might not fit features of Chinese arson very well. Arson risk of different targets could be calculated in the similar 
method if there is a more complete domestic arson event data, to provide more effective direction of arson defensive 
resource allocation in China.  
On the other hand, defensive information of target is lacking in Global Terrorism Database. Moreover, a majority of 
defensive information is from abroad and could not be proved. Thus the validity of different defensive measures couldn’t be 
acquired in study. In further research, targeted analysis on the risk of different targets with different defensive measures is 
needed to adopt, so as to make more effective defense decision on each target. 
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3.3. Conclusion 
The numerical variation of arson is analyzed in this article. Arson risk models of different target types are set up based on 
risk analysis method, which helps transform macro decision problems into analysis of existing data ones. Threat, 
vulnerability, consequence and risk are analyzed by large amount of real data from Global Terrorism Database, providing 
scientific guidance for arson defensive measures and resource allocation of different target types. In future research, both 
the features of internal arson and the validity of different arson defensive measures will be further studied, supplying 
scientific evidence for arson defense and macro emergency decision-making. 
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